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Abstract
Emotions have been found to underpin the moral hierarchy of values and beliefs within and among groups by restraining
undesirable attitudes and behavior. As such, emotions serve as potential indicators for analyzing whether or not certain
norms are still deemed relevant. As Jon Mercer puts it: “One way to test for the presence of norms is to look for emo-
tion”. While the literature in International Relations (IR) generally accepts the emotional underpinnings of norms, there
has been strikingly little elaboration of appropriate methods and criteria for studying the link between emotion and norms
in IR. In this contribution, I suggest that socialization processes in a security community involve the internalization of ap-
propriate rules of emotional expression or, in short, emotion norms. I propose that emotion norms can be historically
traced via the emotional vocabulary and expressive rules derived from the production of texts. To do this, I searched for
documents and treaties that serve as canonical texts for the collective self-conception and self-image of the transatlantic
security community. As I hope to show, in these texts one can find substantial evidence of emotion norms, which desig-
nates these documents as ‘emotional landmarks’ that embody the emotional construction of the transatlantic emotional
(security) community.
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1. Introduction
How do members of international institutions exercise
power and authority when they generally lack formal
rules and norms? In this contribution, I argue that
international institutions—more specifically the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—are composed of
emotion norms that set the frame for appropriate in-
terpretations and meanings of emotional performance
among its members, and thus incorporate sociocultural
standards into the emotional lives of agents. Emotion
norms provide intersubjective patterns of standardized
emotional expressions that underpin collective mean-
ings and beliefs, and thus constitute a particular com-
munity by setting it apart from others. What makes
emotions political, and thus relevant for International
Relations (IR), is their communitarian nature: the emo-
tional connections between individuals and their re-
spective communities (Hutchison, 2016; von Scheve &
Salmela, 2014).
To develop this argument, this article takes a so-
cial constructivist viewpoint for studying emotions in
world politics (Harré, 1986). A social constructivist per-
spective argues that emotions are cultural products that
owe their meaning and purpose to socially acquired
feeling rules (Abu-Lughod & Lutz, 1990; Averill, 1980;
Hochschild, 1979). Social constructivist emotion theories
are based on a shared set of interrelated ontological and
epistemological assumptions that separate them from
more conventional emotion theories. Whereas biologi-
cal and cognitivist emotion theories stick to a subjective
ontology of emotion, social constructivism shifts the an-
alytical focus from their internal phenomenological per-
ception of emotions and a psychological appraisal by in-
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dividuals to their representative articulation and com-
munication within social spheres. This does not mean
that a constructivist approach to emotions simply de-
nies their phenomenological expression in the sense
of physically perceived feelings or ignores the role of
the body in enacting feeling rules. Social constructivists
are less interested in the inner feelings and thoughts
of individuals but instead focus on the socially shared
emotional patterns within and between groups. Con-
structivists thus employ a social ontology of emotions
that is less concerned with investigating the subjectiv-
ity but rather the intersubjectivity of emotions. From
this social ontology of emotions follows a social episte-
mology. A social epistemology of emotions states that
emotions, and the discourses and power relationships
they disclose, can only be fully grasped within the col-
lectively shared meaning systems and social worlds in
which they are represented and known. To sum up, con-
structivist emotion researchers are interested in the par-
ticular sociocultural spaces in which emotions are con-
textualized, the institutional and discursive mechanisms
through which they are expressed, and the prescriptive
and purposive social functions they serve to include or
exclude subjects from entering the boundaries of their
respective communities.
This suggests an underlying functionalist role for
emotions. That is, emotions are not simply socially
constructed, but these emotions serve an important
purpose by fulfilling a series of social functions for a
community (e.g., producing solidarity, disciplining non-
compliance, affirming moral order, clarifying social hier-
archy, etc.). Conversely, resistance to comply with estab-
lished emotional conventions challenges the very foun-
dations of such communities and paves the way for un-
dermining and transforming them (Fattah& Fierke, 2009;
Hutchison, 2016; Koschut, 2014). Such a communitarian
theory of emotions can help unpack and resolve the puz-
zle of how communities manage and distribute authority
and power, particularly when they lack formal or written-
down rules and norms.
2. Towards a Methodological Framework for Studying
Emotional (Security) Communities
The concept of emotional community was originally de-
veloped by the historian Barbara Rosenwein. Emotional
communities are “groups in which people adhere to
the same norms of emotional expression and value—
or devalue—the same or related emotions” (Rosenwein,
2006, p. 2). Rosenwein looks at how emotional commu-
nities formed and vanished during the Early Middle Ages
and showshow these communities emotionally linked to-
gether a particular group of actors through the expres-
sion of a particular set of collectively shared emotions.
While her empirical focus lies on selected emotional com-
munities at a particular point in time, she explicitly for-
mulates her concept as being universally applicable, for
all times and cultures including nation-states and the
modern world, making it particularly relevant for the
study of world politics (Rosenwein, 2010, p. 12).
An emotional community rests on shared “accepted
modes of emotional expression” that can be method-
ologically traced through similar emotional styles and dis-
course (Rosenwein, 2006, p. 24). Such emotion norms
provide the emotional fingerprint that makes one emo-
tional community distinguishable from other emotional
communities. The members of an emotional commu-
nity may (and often do) disagree on a variety of issues.
What remains important is that, in resolving their con-
flicts, members follow the use and expression of prop-
erly agreed emotion norms, e.g., when and how anger
is an acceptable form of emotional expression. In such
communities, emotions donot “float freely” but areman-
aged by its members in a way that makes themmore reli-
able (Flam, 1990). Emotional communities thus limit the
availability of particular emotional expressions in a given
situation and their impact on proper behavior. Finally,
emotional communitiesmay overlap and somemembers
may be part of several emotional communities at the
same time (Rosenwein, 2006, pp. 109, 199).
How can we study emotional communities in world
politics? Rosenwein (2006; 2010) considers emotional
communities to be also “textual communities”, in which
people are linked together through shared discourse and
narratives. From a methodological viewpoint, such tex-
tual and verbal utterances provide researchers with a
promising way to make emotions empirically accessible
for researchers. As Bleiker and Hutchison (2008, p. 128)
note, “one of themost promising locations to study emo-
tions is in the manner in which they are represented and
communicated”. The approach put forward here is to ask
for a method of inquiry that involves careful attempts
to analyze emotions via their representational meaning
within social spheres. A promisingway to study these rep-
resentations, and thus gain access to emotional mean-
ings, is through their explication in discourse (Koschut,
2017a, 2017b). Below, I suggest some elements that a
methodology of emotional communities must entail.
2.1. Gathering a Dossier of Sources
Rosenwein (2006) started with groups of individuals that
already lived a communal life. For this group, she com-
piled a broad array of sources. The focus here should
be on emotions that are explicitly expressed or tacitly
implied over a range of sources and within or across a
coherent time period. This may include a variety of tex-
tual sources, including (but not limited to) official state-
ments (speeches, press releases, parliamentary debates),
legal texts (treaties, conventions, agreements), biograph-
ical texts (diaries, autobiographies, personal notes), me-
dia texts (newspaper articles, interviews, editorials), and
even popular culture (poems, novels, songs). While the
selection of texts ultimately depends on the research
question, there are some things to consider when study-
ing the emotionswithin these texts.While it is preferable
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to have several different utterances from the group, re-
searchers have to ultimately make do with what is avail-
able. Another problem results from the temporal fram-
ing of texts. Emotional expressions during relatively brief
and unstable periods, such as a crisis, are likely to be very
different from those expressed during more stable peri-
ods. Finally, texts are highly contingent on their historical
and cultural embedding. It is thus important to include a
larger text-based analysis from the relevant time period
under study as well as secondary sources to confirm or
disconfirm the findings and/or to detect changes in emo-
tional meanings and expressions.
2.2. Establishing Patterns and Meanings
Once the researcher has managed to gather a satisfac-
tory dossier of sources, the next step would be to extract
emotion words from them and to assemble similar emo-
tion words into dossiers. Here, it is important to keep in
mind that emotions are often expressed implicitly, for
example through imagery, figurative speech or connota-
tions. Concepts such as genocide, terrorist, rogue state,
outlaw, massacre not only carry a negative appeal but
they also refer indirectly to specific emotions of disap-
proval such as anger and contempt. By contrast, emo-
tional connotations such as peaceful, freedom fighter,
hero, honest broker, responsible member of the interna-
tional community indicate a different emotional attitude.
Or consider the emotional underpinnings of metaphors.
For example, to speak of floods of refugees produces fear
among members of a community through a linguistic de-
humanization of refugees. Thus, in addition to paying at-
tention to emotion terms like fear, it is equally important
to pay attention to borrowings and imagery in emotional
language, such as metaphors or figures of speech. Also,
the meanings resulting from emotional expressions are
often sociocultural constructs andmay thus resonate dif-
ferently from culture to culture. Finally, it is equally im-
portant to read the silence (the emotion terms that are
avoided) and how different kinds of silences can hold dif-
ferent kinds of emotional experiences.
2.3. Tracing the Cultural Script
Having established significant patterns and meanings of
emotional expressions, the researcher will then be able
to trace the cultural script and thus uncover the system
of feelings underlying emotional communities. It is not
sufficient to establish a set of emotionwords. Rather, the
weight and significance of these words needs to be ex-
amined: “what these communities (and the individuals
within them) define and assess as valuable or harmful
to them; the evaluations they make about other’s emo-
tions; the nature of the affective bonds between people
that they recognize; and the modes of emotional expres-
sion that they expect, encourage, tolerate, and deplore
(Rosenwein, 2002, p. 842). Researchers who wish to
trace the emotion norms of a particular emotional com-
munity need to consider which emotions are most fun-
damental to their styles of expression and sense of com-
munity. Thismay be achieved through two types ofmeth-
ods, both of which can be easily combined. In putting the
dossier together, one might establish the frequency of
particular emotion words with a quantitative evaluation
or simple word count. Another way would be to conduct
a qualitative interpretation of particular emotion words
or their lack as part of a larger cultural framework.
2.4. Detecting Change over Time
Emotions are neither inherently moral nor beyond the
scope ofmoral consideration, but they are deeply rooted
in the collective values and beliefs of communities. By
tracing such emotions, we can learn a lot about the
values and moral meanings of these communities. But
emotional communities are also subject to change. Emo-
tions can change and sometimes vary significantly in
their historical meaning and cultural expression. A fruit-
ful strategy to analyze norms and their social conse-
quences is to conduct a broad historical analysis that
is able to retrieve identifiable patterns of emotional ex-
pressions that might tell us something about how emo-
tion norms—the expression of appropriate emotions in
a given situation—have come to be constituted in their
current form. A promising research strategy to develop
such a genealogy of standardized emotional expressions
over time is to historicize them. To historicize emotions
means “subjecting discourses on emotion, subjectivity,
and the self to scrutiny over time, looking at them
in particular spatial locations and historical moments,
and seeing whether and how they have changed” (Abu-
Lughod & Lutz, 1990, p. 5). The sociologist Norbert Elias
(1939/1994), for example, suggests in his seminal work
on the history of emotions that standards of emotional
expressions gradually changed in the course of a long
“civilizing process” in Western societies. Building on Elias
(1939/1994), IR scholars such as Linklater (2014, p. 574)
argue that increasingly pacified political communities in
the Western world have tabooed open displays of anger
since anger is regarded as triggering violence.
3. Tracing the Emotion Norms of the Transatlantic
Security Community
In this contribution, I suggest that emotional socializa-
tion in a security community involves the internaliza-
tion of appropriate rules of emotional expression—or
emotion norms. The concept of security community was
introduced to IR by Karl W. Deutsch in 1957, describ-
ing it as a regional system of independent states that
is characterized by such high levels of amity and pat-
terns of social communication and interaction that war
between its members becomes virtually inconceivable.
Since then, many scholars have made use of the con-
cept and expanded its original scope, broadened its em-
pirical use and positioned it as an alternative concept
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to other forms of security governance and peaceful or-
ders such as alliances, regimes, international organiza-
tions, and imperial orders. Emanuel Adler and Michael
Barnett’s (1998) path breaking book is perhaps the most
well-known scholarly work among many others. This im-
pressive attention to the concept and workings of se-
curity communities in IR, however, has not included a
sustained consideration of emotions. Deutsch’s magnif-
icent work on security communities was largely devoid
of a substantial treatment of emotions. This is not to
argue that Karl Deutsch did not pay attention to the
emotions. Deutsch’s philosophical assumptions on hu-
man reason included a firm belief that the essential po-
litical and economic questions of world politics lie be-
yond the rational-choice paradigm and instead “are at
bottom moral and spiritual” (Deutsch, 1967, p. 64). As
Donald Puchala (1981, p. 151) notes in his reflections on
Deutsch’s theory of integration: “Deutsch’s most impor-
tant contribution to the study of international integra-
tion are in his findings concerning sentimental relations
among peoples”. Deutsch found human behavior to re-
sult from the interplay of reason and emotion arguing
that people “is a community of rational beings united in
the object of their love”. The fact that Deutsch explicitly
refers to the emotions demonstrates his awareness of
their constitutive role in shaping social life. As he notes
in his description of the North Atlantic area, there ex-
ists a “‘Western’ way of life which is so often felt and re-
ferred to” (Deutsch et al., 1957, p. 134). In fact, Deutsch
goes as far as to conceive of collectively shared emotions
as a necessary condition of a security community for-
mation because this makes it more resistant to manag-
ing crises: “The kind of sense of community that is rele-
vant for integration, and therefore for our study, turned
out to be rather a matter of mutual sympathy and loyal-
ties; of ‘we-feeling’, trust, and mutual consideration…in
short, amatter of a perpetual dynamic process ofmutual
attention, communication, perception of needs, and re-
sponsiveness in the process of decision-making. ‘Peace-
ful change’ could not be assured without this kind of
relationship” (Deutsch et al., 1957, p. 36). “We-feeling”
describes the formation of an emotional bond among
members of the security community that underpins so-
cial belonging to this particular group, or as Deutsch put
it: “common subjective feelings of the legitimacy of the
integrated community, making loyalty to it also a mat-
ter of internalized psychic compulsion” (Deutsch, 1966,
p. 241). In other words, members of security community
conceive themselves as part of an emotional community,
in the sense that they feel as a community.
Attributing emotions, or emotion norms to an inter-
national institution, such as NATO, is not an uncontrover-
sial position. It raises fundamental questions concerning
the level of analysis and conceptual scope of studying
security communities as emotional communities. Many
of these conceptual issues have been dealt elsewhere
(Koschut, 2014). This article is more concerned with
the practical and methodological ways to operational-
ize emotions. Still, since the article relates directly to
normative emotional discourses and the legitimization
of emotion norms, the emotion-knowledge-power nexus
needs to be further addressed here. Understanding se-
curity communities as emotional communities points to
the epistemological centrality of emotional knowledge.
Emotional knowledge is an agent’s ability to cognitively
and morally categorize emotional expressions and to
emotionally connect these affective categories toOthers’
identities based on experience over time (Frevert, 2011).
In other words, members have to be able to knowwhat it
means to be angry, ashamed, or happy in order to under-
stand its social implications and evoke appropriate emo-
tional reactions toward others within a particular social
situation based on previous experience and moral judg-
ments. For example, anger can be interpreted as destruc-
tive to close relationships because one may have experi-
enced the destructive nature of anger in previous rela-
tionships. At the same time, anger may be perceived as
displaying the closeness of a relationship based on a very
different emotional experience.
Emotional knowledge is based on intersubjective
learning, i.e., the habituated establishment and recur-
ring exchange of emotions that shape the identities of
social actors. One member communicates emotions to
other members who then give emotional feedback and,
in turn, receive emotional feedback on their part, and so
on. Through this perpetuating process of emotional so-
cialization, members of an emotional (security) commu-
nity can enter a stage of understanding by building a com-
mon emotional history togetherwhich contributes to the
establishment of sharedmeanings and even trust (Oatley
& Jenkins, 1996, p. 181). In sum, emotional knowledge
is about orientation and meaning. It is the accumulation
ofmemories, foundingmyths, experiences, and symbolic
patterns that enables members to make sense of the
world around them within an emotionally shared reality.
Process sociology has shown how emotional knowl-
edge forms part of asymmetries of power and status
in which “established” groups secure the compliance of
outsiders (Elias & Scotson, 1965). Insiders maintain and
reproduce a particular self-image of social superiority
vis-à-vis outsiders based on group charisma and emo-
tional knowledge (feeling of social superiority/pride). At
the same time, established groups persuade outsiders to
internalize feelings of social inferiority (shame) through
emotional rigidity, stigmatization, and by placing the
contact of insiders with outsiders under a taboo. Ac-
cordingly, contact with outsiders is associated with neg-
ative feelings. Through these figuration processes, ‘in-
side’ groups exercise and maintain a power asymmetry
that is rooted in emotional knowledge (Elias & Scotson,
1965, pp. 8, 12).
Inside an emotional (security) community, members
are not treated as approximate equals but are woven
together in asymmetrical power relationships. The self-
image of the established group is formed based on
the minority of its ‘best’ members (core group). This
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core group performs a norm building function and ex-
ercises power over potential or actual norm breakers
through control and stigmatization (Elias & Scotson,
1965, pp. 13, 42). Members can only participate in an
emotional community by complying with certain emo-
tional patterns of affect control. Members who do not
comply by siding with or showing sympathy toward out-
sider groups will risk losing their power and status within
the “inside” group. In other words, the core group is able
to teach and enforce emotion norms. The notion of a
core group corresponds nicely with Deutsch’s notion of
“cores of strength” within a security community. Secu-
rity communities develop around cores of strength that
possess material and moral authority due to their su-
perior material power, international legitimacy, and ac-
quired norms and practices (Adler, 2001, p. 147; Deutsch
et al., 1957, p. 28). In the transatlantic (emotional) se-
curity community, it seems fair to suggest that the US
forms such a core. In sum, processes of emotional social-
ization involving power and status are constantly present
in an emotional (security) community and reproduced
through knowledge: less superior members assimilate
in relation to more powerful core groups, rivaling other
members for status and power, shaping and reshap-
ing their emotional experience and group charisma, or
responding in ways that satisfy other members (Elias,
1939/1994). Hence, emotional knowledge and power
are interwoven: communicating and transferring emo-
tional knowledgewithin and between groups constitutes
and maintains power relationships.
The emotion norms in the transatlantic security com-
munity will be empirically traced here on the inside as
well as on the outside. Accordingly, the case study is
structured into two parts. First, the presence and ef-
fects of the inside emotion norm of amity will be shown.
Second, the case study will switch perspective by look-
ing at the outside emotion norm of enmity expressed
by the same community members. The empirical anal-
ysis will mainly focus on key documents and elite dis-
course among political leaders. Political leaders are de-
fined here as “responsible decision-makers” having a po-
litical mandate in one form or another which includes
heads of state, heads of governments, cabinet mem-
bers and other elected representatives (Hill, 2003). Since
political leaders are publicly mandated representatives
of their respective state one would expect them to in-
ternalize (at least to a significant extent) the emotion
norms of the emotional (security) community (Eznack,
2012, p. 242).
It is fair to suggest that many political leaders may
simply not show their “true” emotions unless it is politi-
cally opportune. Thus, the emotional expressions (or lack
thereof) on the surface may not necessarily reflect what
these individuals feel underneath. Obviously, it is impos-
sible to look into the heads of political decision makers—
be it interests, ideas, or emotions and this article is no
exception to that. Even though these limitations are real
they do not make the empirical analysis irrelevant. The
main task of this article is to show that emotions have
a binding role in social arrangements at different levels
of world politics. It is thus less interested in emotional
patterns within individual political leaders but more in-
clined to trace emotional patterns between individual
political leaders and the societies they represent. This
conception can be based on Elias concept of ‘figuration’:
“The social fabric and its historical change are not chaotic
but possess, even in phases of greatest unrest and dis-
order, a clear pattern and structure. To investigate the
totality…does not mean to study each individual process
within it. It means first of all to discover the basic struc-
tures which give all the individual processes…their direc-
tion and their specific stamp” (Elias, 1939/1994, p. 400).
A similar argument can be found in the concept of emo-
tionology, which distinguishes the collective emotional
standards from personal emotional experiences (Stearns
& Stearns, 1985, p. 813).
It is argued here that inside a security community,
members value and encourage emotions that emphasize
the norm of amity like empathy, pride, gratitude, honor,
respect, compassion, and sympathy. At the same time,
they tend to discourage or show restraint toward emo-
tional expressions that stress the norm of enmity such
as fear, disgust, hatred, jealousy, and rage. Outside the
security community, members collectively express emo-
tions that are compatible with the norm of enmity, such
as anger or fear, toward those non-members that are per-
ceived as threatening or incompatible with the commu-
nity’s “way of life”. What is of importance to the argu-
ment developed here is that a combination of particular
emotional expressions (and their meaning) directed in-
wards, and reserved exclusively for the members of the
emotional community, and particular emotional expres-
sions directed outwards, contribute to the consolidation
and stability of the community during crises (Koschut,
2014). Based on this inside/outside dualism, the emotion
norms of an emotional (security) community are catego-
rized here as amity (inside) and enmity (outside).
3.1. Inside Emotion Norm: Amity
Amity produces durable bonds, reliability, and trust in
at least three ways. First, it assures a “distinctive way
of life” and a sense of belonging that sets the commu-
nity apart fromother areas and regions including the one
they previously inhabited (Deutsch et al., 1957). The de-
velopment of such away of life is closely related to the so-
cial construction of a collective identity, a sense of com-
munity or “we-feeling” in a security community (Adler
& Barnett, 1998). Second, amity encourages community
members to respond to each other’s needs, messages,
and behavior in a way that enables members to resolve
their conflicts peacefully. Finally, through processes of
social learning the emotional expressions of community
members align in a way that enables them to predict
one another’s intentions and, ultimately, to overcome
feelings of uncertainty. As van Hoef and Oelsner (2018)
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also argue in this issue, this alignment of collectively ex-
pressed emotions serves as a background condition for
peaceful interaction by developing shared moral mean-
ing. In an emotional (security) community, members feel
secure through an intensified emotional state of connect-
edness and belonging: they “lose their selves in the oth-
ers” (Flam, 1990, p. 48). In sum, the norm of amity per-
forms important functionswithin an emotional (security)
community: it encourages mutual commitment, respon-
siveness, and predictability and thus contributes to the
stabilization of collective identification and mutual trust.
The emotion norm of amity can be historically traced
via the emotional vocabulary and expressive rules from
the production of texts. In order to do this, I searched for
documents and treaties that can be said to have served
as canonical texts or monuments for the self-conception
and self-image of the transatlantic security community.
For this purpose, I chose the North Atlantic Treaty of
1949 (which is also known as theWashington Treaty) and
the Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the In-
vocation of Article 5 on September 12, 2001. Both texts
constitute central reference points as seminal historical
moments for the transatlantic security community. The
Washington Treaty forms the foundational charter of the
transatlantic security community. The Statement on the
Invocation of Article 5 marks the first time the transat-
lantic security community formally activated the collec-
tive defense clause. In these texts, one can find substan-
tial evidence of the emotion norms of amity, which des-
ignates these documents not only as textual monuments
but, significantly, also as emotional landmarks that em-
body the emotional knowledge and norms of the transat-
lantic emotional (security) community.
First, in the preamble of the Washington Treaty
(NATO, 1949), NATO members pledge to promote “well-
being” in the North Atlantic area. Well-being obviously
implies not just material benefits but, importantly, also
a psychological state of emotional well-being, free from
fear or anxiety. Both conceptions, “to live in peace”
and “well-being” arguably form the raison d’être for the
Atlantic community. Significantly, they are rooted not
just in cognitive beliefs about the shared history and val-
ues of a socially constructed “North Atlantic area”, but
in shared emotional beliefs of overcoming mutual suspi-
cion and fear (the security dilemma) as well as creating
a state of confidence and trust among its members (the
security community). In the Washington Treaty, “peace”
and “well-being” is consequently equated with feelings
of pleasure (“desire”), feelings of purpose (“to safeguard
freedom”), and a social connection of mutual belong-
ing (“the common heritage and civilization of their peo-
ples”). In the subsequent treaty articles, one finds fur-
ther traces of emotional expressions that reinforce amity.
For example, in Articles 2 and 3, respectively, members
express emotional feelings of amity by emphasizing the
“friendly” (sympathy, respect) character of their relation-
ship and the goal to promote “better understanding”,
“mutual aid” and “encouragement” (care-taking, com-
passion, empathy) among them. Mutual “consideration”
and “respect” is voiced explicitly in Articles 9 and 11,
respectively, implying not only a pledge “to consult to-
gether” aboutmatters of common interest but also awill-
ingness to take the feelings of other members into ac-
count before taking action in order to avoid making fel-
low members feel upset or angry. All of these aspects
can be said to promote a “we-feeling” among members
of the transatlantic security community that is reinforced
by frequent references to solidarity and unity (“resolved
to unite”, “encourage…collaboration”, “assist”, “in con-
cert”). Themost important aspect, however, is the princi-
ple of collective defence enshrined in Article 5 of NATO’s
founding treaty, which bears a highly symbolic and sa-
cred quality to NATOmembers. As the official website of
NATO (2018) explains:
The principle of collective defence is at the very heart
of NATO’s founding treaty. It remains a unique and
enduring principle that binds its members together,
committing them to protect each other and setting a
spirit of solidarity within the Alliance.
In a Durkheimian sense, the principle of collective de-
fence resembles a cultural totem that reflects the secu-
rity community’s collective sense of purpose, arouses in-
tense emotions, and reinforces metaphysical beliefs of
mutual trust and solidarity (Durkheim, 1912/2001).
Second, the statement by the North Atlantic Council
(NATO, 2001) on the historical occasion of invoking
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in response to the
September 11th attacks on the United States puts the
emotion norm of amity into practice. As pointed out
above, since the principle of collective defence en-
shrined in Article 5 constitutes a sacred quality for the
members of the security community as well as the sym-
bolic manifestation of mutual trust and collective iden-
tity, its invocation (and above all, for the first time in
its 52-year history) should arouse very intense emotions
that can be traced in the text of the statement.Moreover,
these emotional expressions conveyed in the text should
reiterate the emotion norm of amity. Indeed, a closer
study of the statement on the invocation of Article 5
in 2001 reveals just that. NATO members begin by em-
phasizing that even though the principle of collective de-
fence had been originally designed to protect European
members from Communist attack, “it remains no less
valid and no less essential today”. This “commitment”
suggests an emotional state of being dedicated to a com-
mon cause and a pledge to honour a joint obligation. An-
other emotional reference to the emotion norm of amity
is stated when NATO members pay “tribute to the suc-
cess of the Alliance in ensuring the freedom of its mem-
bers during the ColdWar and inmaking possible a Europe
that was whole and free”. Here, we can trace not only
the emotional expression of pride in the collective ac-
complishments of the transatlantic security community
but also underlying gratitude among European member
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states whose safety had been guaranteed by the United
States throughout the Cold War. Most importantly, the
statement expresses shared sympathy and mutual joy
about the unbroken bonds among NATOmembers in the
face of a new threat. This notion is reinforced by mem-
bers’ “reaffirmed…determination”, their “commitments
to one another” and their pledge to “stand ready to
provide the assistance”. Ten years on, this “we-feeling”
continued to feature prominently when the members
of the North Atlantic Council (NATO, 2011) reflected on
the occasion of the 10th Anniversary of the Invocation
of Article 5: “This decision was a powerful expression of
transatlantic solidarity and unity…NATO and our partner
nations from across the world can be proud of what we
have achieved”. The basic connotation of this statement
suggests an attitude of “we stand together and nothing
can divide us”.
As these examples from two key transatlantic texts
illustrate, amity among members of an emotional (secu-
rity) community is chiefly expressed through collective
emotions of care, sympathy, compassion, pride, honor,
gratitude, and respect. The expression of care and sympa-
thy protects its members against indifference by feeling
along with each others’ distress and by “being there” or
caring for each other in symbolic and material ways (the
mutual defense clause comes to mind). Pride and honor
reinforce the confidence among members that they de-
serve and value the privileges and virtue of superiority
that is associated with group membership (“the most
successful defensive alliance in history”). Gratitude and
respect both serve as an emotional commitment to re-
ciprocate in the future. Members of a security commu-
nity do not expect to be “paid back” immediately but
base their exchanges of support and caring on need, not
on payback.
3.2. Outside Emotion Norm: Enmity
Enmity builds trust among members of an emotional
security community by setting insiders apart from out-
siders and thereby generating internal cohesion. Dis-
connecting insiders from outsiders is an act of iden-
tity building necessary for developing and maintaining
a security community (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 38).
In an emotional (security) community, amity and en-
mity are two sides of the same coin. Collective iden-
tification in a security community cannot be treated
in isolation but can only be fully understood if viewed
as an emotional construction of a (or multiple) shared
“disgusting Other(s)” (Leep, 2010). Such a shared Other
must not exclusively be defined in strictly military terms
such as an outside military threat but contains a much
broader concept based on regime type (e.g., democracy
vs. non-democracy), cultural or religious differences (e.g.,
Occident vs. Orient), and/or spatial concepts (e.g., the
Atlantic area vs. the Pacific rim). Thus, the norm of en-
mity must not primarily be defined in terms of material
or physical coercion but rather in terms of a perceived
risk or harm to the distinctive “way of life” of an emo-
tional (security) community.
It is certainly not suggested that all outsiders are
considered a threat. It does emphasize, however, that
such inside/outside configurations sharpen the moral
boundaries between insiders and outsiders. This is par-
ticularly the case in crisis situation when members of
an emotional (security) community become “locked into”
an insider-outsider dualism that is hard to disrupt and
leaves little room for differentiation. It is also important
to point out that this configuration does not negate the
possibility of newmembers to join. It does suggest, how-
ever, that these new members will enter the community
not as approximate equals but as members with inferior
status and power vis-à-vis established members.
The same landmark texts cited above indicate many
emotional expressions of the emotion norms of enmity
that complement the emotion norms of amity. First, the
Washington Treaty addresses the need “to safeguard”
the values and principles shared in the North Atlantic
area, which implies an emotional feeling of fear or anx-
iety that outsiders might undermine or harm the com-
munity’s “way of life”. A similar emotional expression of
fear and anxiety is used in Articles 1 and 4, respectively.
Here, members voice their concern that peace and the
security of any member shall not be “endangered” or
“threatened”. The most vivid expression of the emotion
norm of enmity can be found in NATO’s collective de-
fense clause. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty explic-
itly mentions an “armed attack” by outsiders: “The Par-
ties agree that an armed attack against one or more of
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an
attack against them all”. An armed attack implies emo-
tional feelings of anger or even hatred attributed to out-
siders because the very word “attack” suggests an ag-
gressive and violent intention that may cause great suf-
fering and pain. By pledging to collectively resist such
an attack by outsiders, members simultaneously express
a sense of community and “we-feeling” (“shall be con-
sidered an attack against them all”), perhaps even grat-
itude (mutual defense is a commitment that they make
for each other in the future), that, in turn, reinforces the
emotion norms of amity and reduces unwanted emo-
tions for the in-group, such as fear or anxiety. This dis-
cursive pattern can be found several times in the doc-
ument and, as we shall see, in many other NATO docu-
ments and statements as well. The emotional-linguistic
structuring of texts in emotional communities very often
employs emotional expressions of enmity to reinforce
and strengthen the emotion norm of amity, for exam-
ple by contrasting compassion with contempt (“mutual
aid…to resist attack”) or empathy versus fear (“consult
together whenever…any of the Parties is threatened”).
Underlying this pattern is the idea of triggering an emo-
tional upward spiral that increases the confidence and
trust that members invest in the community, while simul-
taneously reducing or even eliminating feelings of uncer-
tainty and fear.
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Second, the Statement by the North Atlantic Council
on the Invocation of Article 5 contains very intense emo-
tional expressions that more directly reflect the emo-
tion norm of enmity. For example, NATO members “con-
demn” the “appalling attacks” and “acts of barbarism”
that were “perpetrated” against the United States. The
latter verbal use of perpetrate constitutes an emotional
reference to dishonourable behaviour by someone else.
This statement represents a vivid case of emotional
Othering (a “disgusting Other”) by strategically employ-
ing emotional expressions of contempt and anger against
particular outsiders (see also Sanchez Salgado, 2018, in
this issue). This is further underlined when NATO mem-
bers refer to the “scourge of international terrorism”.
By employing a synonym for something extremely evil
and menacing, NATO members express emotions of con-
tempt and anger against a radical Other. At the same
time, they reveal emotional expressions of fear and grief
by referring to 9/11 as an event that caused great suffer-
ing. Likewise, the mentioning of “appalling attacks” ex-
poses emotional expression of fear in response to aggres-
sive action by enemy forces coupled with an affective ad-
jective emphasizing grief for the victims of the attacks.
As these examples illustrate, enmity toward out-
siders is expressed through collective emotions of fear,
anger, contempt, and jealousy. Fear alerts members to
an imminent danger focusing attention on the source of
the threat. Jealousy mobilizes members to protect their
values and attachments against outsiders. Anger and con-
tempt reinforce attachment to community values by ac-
tivating collective emotions against other groups or life
styles that seem to work against the values of the se-
curity community. The emotion norm of enmity is par-
ticular evident when members of a security community
practically engage in military interventions against out-
siders, as Gray (1959, p. 146) explains: “We cannot fight
without an image of the enemy as totally evil, for whom
any mercy or sympathy is incongruous, if not traitorous”.
In other words, the emotion norm of enmity “closes the
ranks” by focusing attention on the negative attributes
of outsiders.
To sum up, the emotion norms of amity and enmity—
a combination of particular emotional expressions (and
their meaning) directed inwards and reserved exclu-
sively for themembers of the emotional community, and
particular emotional expressions directed outwards—
undergird and strengthen the transatlantic security com-
munity. Emotions underpin the distinct set of values and
beliefs “that makes up much of that ‘Western’ way of
life which is so often felt and referred to” (Deutsch et al.,
1957, p. 134).
4. Conclusion
In this contribution, I advanced the argument that so-
cial relations between members of a security commu-
nity resemble an emotional community. I sought to
demonstrate how security communities are constituted
through the development and expression of emotion
norms and proposed that emotion norms can be his-
torically traced via the emotional vocabulary and ex-
pressive rules derived from the production of texts. In
the end, this contribution advocates investing more re-
search into the practical ways to study emotions empiri-
cally. We cannot allow methodological conventions and
epistemological “fist-fighting” to cut us off from emo-
tions’ less easily detected effects simply because conven-
tional social science methods cannot account for all as-
pects of emotion. Instead, we need concrete tools and
techniques as well as greater cross-fertilization across
areas of specialization—a “thinking without a banister”
(Arendt, 2018)—within the discipline of IR, and the so-
cial sciences more generally. Proposing such a method-
ological toolkit, I drew on linguistic accounts as well as in-
terpretative approaches by historians to advance the de-
velopment of concrete research tools and methods that
would facilitate cross-disciplinary inquiries, overcoming
existingmethodological hurdles. As envisioned by the ed-
itors of this special issue, such an interdisciplinary focus
offers an ideal way that builds on and enters into dia-
loguewith other disciplines, including Psychology, Sociol-
ogy, History, and Anthropology. In the end, this approach
entails two paradigmatic shifts: first, understanding se-
curity communities as emotional (security) communities
that are guided by collectively shared emotion norms
forces a conceptual rethinking about our knowledge of
the internal mechanisms within these groups and con-
tributes to a wider debate about the socio-psychological
and emotional foundation of world politics. Second, it
offers a radical departure from the overwhelming dom-
inance of the rational actor paradigm in much of the so-
cial sciences, which has stood in the way of taking emo-
tions seriously.
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